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CHILD TESTIMONY VIA TWO-WAY CLOSED CIRCUIT
TELEVISION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON MARYLAND V. CRAIG IN
UNITED STA TES V. TURNING BEAR AND UNITED STA TES V.
BORDEAUX
Aaron Harmon'
For Confrontation Clause purposes, child testimony by two-
way closed circuit television is substantively different from one-
way closed circuit television. Two-way closed circuit testimony is
preferable because it more closely approximates face-to-face
confrontation. The Supreme Court's case-specific holding in
Maryland v. Craig was directed at one-way closed circuit
testimony. As such, the Eighth Circuit was mistaken in conflating
the two forms of testimony when it relied on Craig to overturn both
United States v. Turning Bear and United States v. Bordeaux, and
was similarly mistaken in holding that § 3509 of the Child Victims'
and Witnesses' Rights statute was unconstitutional to the extent it
conflicted with Craig.
I. INTRODUCTION
A child sits nervously at a table in a conference room. In front
of her is a video camera, and to the left of the camera sits a
television screen. Across the table from the child sit two attorneys.
The defense attorney is wearing a headset with a microphone. In a
courtroom down the hall, the jury, judge, and defendant are all
watching an identically sized television screen. In front of the
defendant is a video camera. Like the defense attorney, the
defendant is also wearing a headset and microphone. As the
prosecuting attorney questions the child, the defendant closely
watches the screen, occasionally whispering into his headset. Back
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2007. Special
thanks to Professor Richard Myers for his helpful comments and guidance, and
to Judge James A. Wynn, Jr. of the North Carolina Court of Appeals for
introducing me to this topic.
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in the room with the child, the defense attorney nods and writes
something on his legal pad. Glancing occasionally at the
defendant's face on the television screen, the child answers softly,
her facial expressions and mannerisms as plainly visible to those in
the courtroom as the defendant's are to the child.
When a child witness testifies via two-way closed circuit
television, the child can see the defendant and the defendant can
see the child. Everyone present in the courtroom is able to observe
the child's mannerisms and other behaviors, and can draw
conclusions as to whether or not he or she is telling the truth. The
defendant can communicate freely with his or her attorney, and the
child is able to testify out of the presence of the defendant, which
provides a less threatening environment than being in close
proximity to his or her alleged abuser. The mediated nature of the
interaction reduces the pressure on the child, who is already in a
traumatic situation, without undermining the defendant's right to
confront and cross-examine his or her accuser. As a result, the
child is given the opportunity to communicate more freely without
sacrificing either the reliability of his or her testimony or the jury's
ability to observe her.'
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides, in part,
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him...."'
Although the right to confrontation is a cornerstone of due process
in criminal trials, the requirement of actual face-to-face
confrontation has in some cases been relaxed due to overriding
policy reasons.4 One such policy rationale involves testimony by
2See Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 Hous.
L. REV. 1003, 1018 (2003) ("To be sure, Craig does not, as some commentators
have complained, deal away the criminal defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause. Most of the elements needed for assuring the reliability
of the evidence-testimony under oath, cross-examination, and examination of
the witness's demeanor-are preserved.[footnore omitted.] Only face-to-face
confrontation is compromised, and this compromise is not made easily.").
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 See Richard Bialczak & Dorothy Wong, Fourth Annual Review of Gender
and Sexuality Law: Violence Law Chapter: Evidentiary Matters in Sexual
Offense Cases, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 525, 560 (2002).
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child victims in abuse cases, where there exists a particularly
strong interest in minimizing trauma to the alleged victim.'
In 1990, the Supreme Court addressed concerns over closed
circuit testimony in Maryland v. Craig.6 Their holding was two-
fold. First, in a more general holding (which had been originally
articulated in Coy v. lowa'), the Court found that a defendant's
"right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a
physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of
such confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured."8 Second, in a case-specific holding, the Court found that
a child witness may testify via one-way closed circuit television
provided it was necessary to protect his or her welfare, that the
presence of the defendant (as opposed to the courtroom
atmosphere generally) would traumatize the child, and that the
impact of emotional distress on the child would be more than de
minimis.9
In 2004, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the more
specific holding of Craig to two-way closed circuit testimony in
United States v. Turning Bear.1" In March 2005, the Eighth Circuit
extended the holding of Turning Bear in United States v.
Bordeaux." The Bordeaux court found the trial court had made
insufficient findings of fact to show that the child witness was
5See Bialczak & Wong, supra note 4, at 559-60; Katherine M. Grearson,
Proposed Uniform Child Witness Testimony Act. An Impermissible
Abridgement of Criminal Defendants'Rights, 45 B.C. L. REv. 467, 472 (2004).
6 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
7 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
8 Craig, 497 U.S. at 850. See also Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021; id. at 1025
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980), overruled
by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
9 Craig, 497 U.S. at 855-56. The Court provided no guidance on what degree
of emotional distress is required to satisfy the de minimis standard. However,
the possibility that the child witness will suffer "serious emotional distress such
that the child cannot reasonably communicate" was held to be sufficient. Id.
0 357 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2004).
"400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005) reh 'g en banc denied, U.S. App. LEXIS 9866
(8th Cir. May 27, 2005).
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traumatized specifically by the presence of the defendant, and not
by the general atmosphere of the courtroom.12 Since, according to
the Bordeaux court, Craig provided the appropriate test, 13 the court
also held that section 3509(b)(1)(B)(1) of the 1990 Child Victims'
and Child Witnesses' Rights statute 4 was unconstitutional to the
extent that it allowed a different showing of emotional distress than
was required by Craig.15 Section 3509 allows child witnesses to
testify using a two-way system if the trial court finds the child
witness is unable to testify because of fear, likelihood of emotional
trauma, or because the child suffers from a mental or other
infirmity. 6
The Eighth Circuit failed to distinguish between the one-way
closed circuit testimony used in Craig and the two-way closed
circuit testimony used in both Bordeaux and Turning Bear.17
Indeed, in Turning Bear the Eighth Circuit neglected to even
mention that the child had testified via two-way closed circuit
television. 8 The Bordeaux court did mention the distinction, but
dismissed it as trivial. 9 The court found that confrontation via
one-way closed circuit television did not differ significantly from a
confrontation via two-way closed circuit television because "the
'confrontations' [created by one-way and two-way closed circuit
television] are virtual, and not real in the sense that a face-to-face
confrontation is real.""
For confrontation purposes, however, a two-way closed circuit
system is preferable to either one-way testimony or prerecorded
video depositions (another form of alternative testimony
12 See Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 555.
'3 See id at 553.
14 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(1) (2000).
15 See Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 553.
16 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B) (2000).
17 See 400 F.3d at 552; 357 F.3d at 735.
18 See generally Turning Bear, 357 F.3d at 730 (referring to both one-way and
two-way systems as "closed-circuit television procedures").
19 See Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 554.20 Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 554.
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commonly used with child witnesses).2' First, and most
importantly, since the witness cannot see the accused, one-way
testimony lacks visual reciprocity, which is a significant element of
face-to-face confrontation. 22 A two-way system, on the other hand,
preserves this constitutional guarantee while simultaneously
minimizing the traumatic effect on the child due to the presence of
a buffer between the child and the accuser.23  Second, the
interaction occurs in real time.24 While a video deposition involves
no confrontation and is recorded prior to trial, two-way closed
circuit testimony allows the jury to observe contemporaneous
interaction between the child witness and defense counsel. Third,
the defendant is able to communicate with his or her attorney
through a headset.26 This enables the defendant to provide input to
counsel for purposes of cross-examination, as though they were
sitting at the same table. As a result, the adversarial nature of the
trial is preserved, and the defense can plan their trial strategy based
on what arises during the child's testimony. Furthermore, the
defense can object in a timely manner to inappropriate testimony,
as attorney and client would if the child actually was testifying in
21 See Grearson, supra note 5, at 468 ("Federal and state courts most
commonly use three types of shielding procedures: screening, videotape, and
closed-circuit television.").
22 Id. ("Closed-circuit television can be either one-way (those present in the
courtroom can see and hear the child, but the child cannot see or hear the
courtroom activity) or two-way (children can see and hear the courtroom
proceedings).").
23 Id. at 469 ("The premise of shielding procedures is the notion that
courtroom confrontation with the defendant, the alleged perpetrator, may
severely traumatize child witnesses.").
24 Id. at 468 ("[C]losed-circuit television instantly transmits the child's out-of-
court direct and cross-examinations into the trial proceedings.").
25 See United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 960 (2003) ("[T]he jury could see [via two-way closed circuit
television] that [the child witness] was able to look at the defendant-or not
look at him-and could take those observations into account in its assessment of
her credibility.").
26 Id. at 487 ("Defense counsel in the witness room wore a headset with a
microphone, as did [the defendant] in the courtroom, so that counsel and the
defendant could communicate during [the child witness's] testimony.").
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the courtroom. 27  For these reasons, two-way closed circuit
television provides the best available method for the preservation
of a defendant's confrontation rights, and mitigates potential
prejudice to the defendant to the fullest possible extent.28
Since the three-part criteria put forth in Craig was specific to
one-way testimony, it should not have controlled the decision in
either Bordeaux or Turning Bear. This Recent Development will
make two arguments. First, the broader holding of Craig (that the
"denial of such confrontation [be] necessary to further an
important policy"29) is more appropriate for the evaluation of two-
way testimony due to both the potential traumatic effects on child
witnesses and the State's clear interest in protecting them. Second,
because two-way testimony in fact preserves the defendant's right
to confrontation, section 3509 of the 1990 Child Victims' and
Child Witnesses' Rights statute (allowing the child to testify via
two-way closed circuit television based on fear, likelihood of
emotional trauma, or mental or other infirmity) is not only
constitutional, but presents a preferable method for child testimony
in appropriate cases.
II. PLACING BORDEAUXIN CONTEXT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Constitutional Origins and Early Interpretations
Although not expressly stated, the language of the Sixth
Amendment has been widely interpreted to require an actual face-
27 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 842 (1990) ("The defendant remains in
electronic communication with defense counsel, and objections may be made
and ruled on as if the witness were testifying in the courtroom.").
28 Multiple cases have held that two-way systems are superior to one-way
systems for capturing the essence of, and preserving the values inherent to, face-
to-face confrontation. See generally United States v. Yates, 391 F.3d 1182 (1 lth
Cir. 2004), vacated, 404 F.3d 1291 (2005); United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d
493, 499 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 960 (2003); United States v.
Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000).
29 497 U.S. at 850 (1990); 487 U.S. at 1021 (1988).
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to-face confrontation between defendants and their accusers.3 °
Accordingly, allowing a witness to testify outside the presence of
the defendant, for any reason, is a technical violation of this
constitutional guarantee.3
The Supreme Court first interpreted the Confrontation Clause
in 1895 in Mattox v. United States.32 In Mattox, the Court found
two essential elements in the Confrontation Clause: (1) the right
of the accused to confront the witness and (2) the right to cross-
examination.3 3 These safeguards help to ensure the veracity of the
witness by allowing the jury to observe his or her demeanor and
mannerisms, as well as by forcing the witness to incriminate the
accused while in his or her presence.3" The Court emphasized and
extended this interpretation in 1899 in Kirby v. United States.35 In
Kirby, the Court held that confrontation and cross-examination
were "fundamental guarantees of life and liberty."36  The
requirements established in these early cases have been upheld
uniformly throughout subsequent court decisions.37
B. Coy v. Iowa: Early Alternative Forms of Testimony
The Supreme Court addressed the use of alternative forms of
testimony for the first time in Coy v. Iowa.38 In Coy, the defendant
was charged with sexually assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls
while they were camping in their backyard next to his house.39 The
girls were permitted to testify with a screen placed between them
and the defendant." The Court reversed Coy's conviction on the
30 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482
U.S. 730, 748, 749-50 (1987); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987).
31 See Grearson, supra note 5, at 472.
32 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
13 See id. at 242-43.
14 See id.
" 174 U.S. 47 (1899).36 Id. at 55.37See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965). See also Ralph H.
Kohlmann, The Presumption of Innocence: Patching the Tattered Cloak after
Marylandv. Craig, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 389, 395 (1996).
38 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); Kohlnann, supra note 37, at 396.
31 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014.
40 id.
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grounds that the procedure violated the defendant's right to
confrontation.4' Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
emphasized the truth-telling effects of face-to-face confrontation,
stating "[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to
his face' than 'behind his back.' In the former context, even if the
lie is told, it will often be told less convincingly."42 However, the
Court acknowledged that the rights preserved in the Confrontation
Clause are not absolute.43 Although it declined to identify specific
exceptions, the Court conceded that exceptions might be justified
"when necessary to further an important public policy."44 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized this point,
stating that confrontation rights "are not absolute but rather may
give way in an appropriate case to other competing interests so as
to permit the use of certain procedural devices designed to shield a
child witness from the trauma of courtroom testimony."45 This
statement was prophetic of her reasoning in the majority opinion in
Maryland v. Craig.
C. Maryland v. Craig: One-Way Closed Circuit Testimony for
Child Victims
Two years after deciding Coy, the Court again had occasion to
evaluate the limits of the Confrontation Clause in the context of
child testimony. This time, faced with another set of facts, the
Court decided the issue differently. In Maryland v. Craig,46 the
defendant was convicted of sexually abusing a six-year-old child.47
The child testified at trial via one-way closed circuit television,
with the jury, judge, and defendant remaining in the courtroom.48
41 Id. at 1022.
421d. at 1019.
431Id. at 1024-25.
44 Id. at 1021.
45 Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
47 Id. at 840.
48Id. at 841-42.
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The defendant was allowed to communicate with her counsel
electronically.49
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, stated that "[t]he
central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the
reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by
subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact."5 The interests protected by
the Confrontation Clause include not only the right of the
defendant to look upon his or her accuser, but also the right to have
his or her accuser: (1) give his or her statement under oath, (2)
submit to cross-examination, and (3) be visible to the jury so that
they may observe the witness's demeanor and evaluate his or her
credibility." Justice O'Connor concluded that "our precedents
confirm that a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses
may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at
trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further
an important public policy and only where the reliability of the
testimony is otherwise assured. 5 2  The Court held that an
"adequate showing of necessity" was required to justify an
alternative form of testimony, and the finding of necessity must be
"case-specific. '5 3  The Court reasoned that Maryland had an
important state interest in preserving the physical and
psychological well-being of the child witness, and held that the use
49 Id; see also Kohlmann, supra note 37, at 397-98 (1996) ("While Craig's
attorney participated in the direct and cross-examination of the complaining
witness, Craig was left to communicate with her lawyer by means of an open
telephone line. Craig, in full view and hearing of the jury, had to speak loudly
enough for her attorney to hear her voice from a telephone receiver that had
been placed on a table in the room in which examination of the witness took
place.") (footnote omitted).
" Craig, 497 U.S. at 845.
51 Id. at 845-46; California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
52 Craig, 497 U.S. at 850. See also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988);
Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980),
overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
243 (1895).
13 Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
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of one-way closed circuit testimony did not "impinge on the truth-
seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause.""4
The Court set forth three criteria that must be satisfied for an
alleged child abuse victim to be allowed to testify via one-way
closed circuit television. First, the trial court must determine that
the use of one-way closed circuit television is necessary to protect
the welfare of the child witness.55 Second, the trial court must find
that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom
generally, but specifically by the defendant.56 Third, the emotional
distress on the child witness must be more than de minimis."
It is important to note that the three-part criterion in Craig
specifies testimony by one-way closed circuit television."
Although the Court uses the generic term "special procedure" on
two occasions, several considerations support the conclusion that
the holding of Craig was intentionally limited to one-way closed
circuit testimony. First, the permissibility of two-way testimony
was not before the Court." The Maryland State Court of Appeals
had specifically addressed the question of whether the child should
testify by two-way or one-way closed circuit television. It found,
based in part on Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Coy,
that two-way systems did not raise a substantial Confrontation
Clause problem.6' Second, the Court held that, although
14 Id. at 852-53.
5 Id. at 855.56 Id. at 856.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 852 ("We are therefore confident that use of the one-way closed
circuit television procedure, where necessary to further an important state
interest, does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the
Confrontation Clause."). See also Grearson, supra note 5, at 491 ("Although the
Craig Court found sufficient reliability in Maryland's one-way closed-circuit
procedure, it did not provide a blanket approval of all shielding procedures. The
Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of other legislative innovations
that permit videotaped or two-way closed-circuit testimony.").
59 Id. at 840 ("This case requires us to decide whether the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment categorically prohibits a child witness in a child
abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial, outside the defendant's
physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television.").
60 Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 567 (1989), vacated by Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836 (1990). See also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1023 (1988) (O'Connor,
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"Maryland's statutory procedure, when invoked, prevents a child
witness from seeing the defendant as he or she testifies against the
defendant at trial," one-way closed circuit testimony "preserves all
of the other elements of the confrontation right."'" Third, in order
to support the Court's finding that states have an important interest
in the psychological and physical well-being of their children,
Justice O'Connor referenced the fact that twenty-four states
allowed the use of one-way testimony and eight states allowed the
use of two-way testimony in such situations.6" This indicates her
awareness of the distinction between the two forms of testimony
and that, as such, her use of the term "one-way" in the opinion was
deliberate. Fourth, subsequent cases involving two-way closed
circuit testimony have distinguished Craig on this point.63 As
such, it is reasonable to conclude that the case-specific holding of
Craig was intentionally limited to one-way closed circuit
television.
After Craig was decided, Congress passed the Child Victims'
and Witnesses' Rights statute. The statute provides federal courts
with guidelines for determining whether public policy interests are
strong enough in a particular case to justify allowing remote
testimony. Section 3509(b)(1) deviates from the holding in Craig
in several important respects. First, it specifies that federal courts
must use a two-way closed circuit system rather than a one-way
J., concurring) (stating that "many such procedures may raise no substantial
Confrontation Clause problem since they involve testimony in the presence of
the defendant" and citing to, inter alia, a New York statute authorizing two-way
closed circuit television).
61 Craig, 497 U.S. at 851. Maryland's statute explicitly provides for
testimony by one-way closed circuit television. See also Craig, 316 Md. at 553
("Designed to facilitate testimony by child witnesses in child abuse (particularly
sexual abuse) cases, [MD. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (2004)] authorizes a judge to
direct that a child's testimony be received via one-way closed-circuit
television.").
62 Craig, 497 U.S. at 853-54.
63 See United States v. Etimani, 328 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 960 (2003); United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 80-81 (2d
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000).
64 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2005); see also Grearson, supra note 5, at 478-79.
65 See Grearson, supra note 5, at 478-79.
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system.66 Next, it expands the grounds for allowing a child witness
to testify remotely to include, in addition to fear, a substantial
likelihood of trauma, mental or other infirmity, or conduct by the
defendant or defense counsel that causes the child to be unable to
continue testifying.67 In addition, the presence of the defendant is
not required to be the specific and exclusive source of the victim's
fear.6" Lower court decisions have held that the section 3509
grounds for allowing two-way testimony are consistent with what
was deemed constitutional in Craig.69
D. Beyond Craig: Two-Way Closed Circuit Testimony in Gigante
and Etimani
United States v. Craig is still the final word from the Supreme
Court on alternative forms of testimony. Since Craig was decided,
other alternative forms of testimony in addition to one-way closed
circuit television have been used widely in child abuse cases.7"
Moreover, the use of alternative forms of testimony has been
extended outside the context of cases involving children.71
In 1999, in United States v. Gigante, the Second Circuit
distinguished Craig when evaluating the use of a two-way system
to take testimony from a Mafia informant who could not be present
at trial. 2 The informant testified via two-way closed circuit
television from a remote location because he was in the final stages
66 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(A) (2005) ("In a proceeding involving an alleged
offense against a child, the attorney for the Government, the child's attorney, or
a guardian ad litem appointed under subsection (h) may apply for an order that
the child's testimony be taken in a room outside the courtroom and be televised
by 2-way closed circuit television.").
67 See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B) (2005).
68 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(1) (2005); see also United States v. Bordeaux,
400 F.3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005) reh "g en banc denied, U.S. App. LEXIS 9866 (8th
Cir. May 27, 2005).
69 United States v. Garcia, 7 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Etimani,
328 F.3d 493, 501 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 960 (2003).
70 Cathleen J. Cinella, Compromising the Sixth Amendment Right to
Confrontation-United States v. Gigante, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 135,
152 (1998).
71 id
72 166 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000).
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of cancer.73 The Second Circuit reasoned that the criteria put forth
in Craig were completely inapplicable to two-way remote
testimony because Craig was intended to compensate for
deficiencies of one-way systems that were absent in two-way
systems.74 The court asserted that "[b]ecause [the trial court]
employed a two-way system that preserved the face-to-face
confrontation celebrated by Coy, it is not necessary to enforce the
Craig standard in this case."75 The Second Circuit did, however,
acknowledge that two-way closed circuit testimony should not be
considered interchangeable with in-court testimony, and that actual
face-to-face confrontations are still preferable.76 Although the
Gigante court did not find Craig applicable, its reasoning is
consistent with the broader holding of Craig, that the exception be
made only "when necessary to further an important public
policy."77
In 2003, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. Etimani.8
In Etimani, a child witness testified by two-way closed circuit
television.79 The witness and her guardian ad litem sat at one end
of a table with her guardian ad litem, and the defense and
prosecuting attorneys sat at the other end of the table. 0 The
defendant and defense counsel wore headsets with microphones so
they could communicate discreetly during cross-examination.81
Additionally, the trial court created an extensive record of the
placement of the cameras and television monitors, both in the
courtroom as well as in the conference room.8 2 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that two-way closed circuit testimony
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1) (the same statute declared
73 Id.
74 Id. at 80-81 ("[T]he Supreme Court crafted this standard to constrain the
use of one-way closed-circuit television, whereby the witness could not possibly
view the defendant").
75 Id. at 81.
7 6 
Id.
77 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
78 328 F.3d 493 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 960 (2003).79 Id. at 497.8 0 Id.
81 id.
82 Id.
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unconstitutional by the Bordeaux Court) was constitutional. 3 The
court also stated that the television monitor must be called to the
attention of the child and be readily visible to her while testifying,
but that it did not have to be directly in front of her. 4  Like
Gigante, the Etimani Court distinguished the holding of Craig
from the use of two-way closed circuit television, stating that "if
Craig upheld the constitutionality of one-way television testimony
in an appropriate case, then two-way television testimony, a
procedure that even more closely simulates in-court testimony,
also passes constitutional muster."8
In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit decided United States v. Yates86
the holding in Gigante that two-way remote testimony is the
constitutional equivalent of face-to-face confrontation.87 The Yates
court held that, as established in Craig, in order to employ closed
circuit technology the prosecution was required to establish that an
important state interest was served. 8 In Yates, two witnesses
located in Australia testified via two-way live videoconference
because they were beyond the subpoena powers of the United
States Attorney and refused to travel to the United States.89 The
court reasoned that providing the jury with crucial prosecution
evidence and a fast resolution to the case were not important public
policies sufficient to satisfy the Craig rule.9" However, Yates has
no precedential value at this time since the court's decision was
vacated in March 2005 after a request for rehearing en banc was
granted.9 Thus, the law in the Eleventh Circuit remains uncertain.
83 Id. at 501.
84 Id. at 495.
85Id. at 499.
86 391 F.3d 1182 (11 th Cir.), vacated, 404 F.3d 1291 (2005).
87Id. at 1186.
18 Id. at 1188.
89Id. at 1184.
90 Id. at 1188.
91 United States v. Yates, 404 F.3d 1291 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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III. TURNING BEAR AND BORDEAUX: INTERPRETATION OR
MISINTERPRETATION OF CRAIG?
In 2004, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Turning
Bear.9 2 In Turning Bear, a child witness testified via two-way
closed circuit television after the trial court found that she was
unable to testify because of fear of the courtroom, the prosecuting
attorney, and the defendant.93 The Court of Appeals opinion,
written by Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold (who also,
coincidentally, authored the subsequent Bordeaux opinion), made
no mention that a two-way system was used, nor that the trial court
had, as in Bordeaux, made witness impact findings on the record
consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(l)(B)(1). 94 The court instead
based its decision on the trial court's failure to make the case-
specific findings outlined in Craig, regardless of the statutory
requirements. 5
The analytical deiciencies in Turning Bear became apparent in
Bordeaux because the appellant in Bordeaux affirmatively argued
that Craig did not apply to two-way systems.96 The Eighth Circuit
reversed the trial court, holding that the failure to make Craig-
specific findings was dispositive. Additionally, the court claimed
that, in Turning Bear, it had declared 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B)(1)
unconstitutional to the extent it conflicted with Craig.9 7 This was
not the case the Turning Bear opinion made no mention of either
two-way closed circuit television or 18 U.S.C. § 3509.98 However,
Bordeaux held otherwise, stating that Turning Bear "involved a
factual situation identical to this one: a child witness testified by
two-way closed circuit television pursuant to § 3509" and that the
Turning Bear court had "concluded that § 3509 was
92 357 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2004).
93 Id. at 735.94 See generally Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730.
95 Id. at 737.
96 United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 2005) reh 'g en banc
denied, U.S. App. LEXIS 9866 (8th Cir. May 27, 2005).97ld. at 553, 555.
98 See generally 357 F.3d 730.
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unconstitutional to the extent that it requires a different showing of
fear from what Craig requires."99 Neither of these principles can
be found anywhere in the Turning Bear opinion, which is ironic
because the central theme in both Turning Bear and Bordeaux is
the importance of exacting judicial specificity.' °
The government's primary argument in Bordeaux was that
Craig was inapposite because it specifically applied to one-way
closed circuit television.'' Instead, the government urged the court
to adopt the reasoning of Gigante, which had found testimony by
two-way closed circuit television to be the constitutional
equivalent of face-to-face confrontation. 2 If the court found
Craig to be inapplicable, there was no bar to upholding the
constitutionality of § 3509 and, in turn, the trial court's findings.0 3
This line of reasoning did not persuade the court, which chose
instead to follow the precedent established in Turning Bear, stating
"[i]n Turning Bear we decided that Craig controlled two-way
systems as well as one-way systems, and we are bound by that
result."'"
After tying its hands with stare decisis, the court stated in dicta
that even if Turning Bear did not compel its decision, it would still
have held that Craig governed on the grounds that testimony via
two-way closed circuit television was not the constitutional
equivalent of a face-to-face confrontation. 5 Two-way systems,
the court concluded, are not significantly different from one-way
systems,0 6 because in both cases the confrontations are "virtual,
and not real."'0 7 According to the court, a confrontation satisfies
the Confrontation Clause if it is likely to make the witness tell the
truth.'0 8 The primary deficiency in virtual confrontation is that it
9' Id. at 553.
'oo See generally Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548; Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730.
101 See id.
102 See id.
103 See id at 553-54.
'lId. at 554.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 id.
108 id.
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may not provide the same truth-inducing effect as "an unmediated
gaze across the courtroom."1"9 In the court's view, both one-way
and two-way closed circuit television are equally deficient in this
regard.1 ' As such, even if it were assumed for the sake of
argument that a two-way system could capture the essence of face-
to-face confrontation, logistical issues (such as the size of the
monitor, positioning of the monitor, and the location of the
cameras, for example) would "render the theoretical promise of the
two-way system practically unattainable.''. Therefore, the Eighth
Circuit announced that it joined the Eleventh Circuit in rejecting
Gigante's holding that two-way systems were constitutional." 2 As
stated above, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the Yates decision three
weeks after Bordeaux was filed, leaving the Eighth Circuit the lone
advocate of this view. 113
IV. VIRTUAL CONFRONTATION-A NEW APPROACH TO
APPLYING CRAIG
In Bordeaux, the Eighth Circuit rejected Gigante's holding that
a two-way system, in itself, satisfies the right to confrontation. 14 It
argued that even the Gigante court had acknowledged the limits of
two-way closed circuit testimony when it stated that "[c]losed
circuit television should not be considered a commonplace
substitute for in-court testimony by a witness. There may well be
intangible elements of the ordeal of testifying in a courtroom that
are reduced or even eliminated by remote testimony."' 1 s
The Eighth Circuit failed to recognize that the Gigante court
did not advocate indiscriminate use of two-way testimony in
trials." 6 To the contrary, the Gigante court found that two-way
109 Id.
10 See id.
". Id. at 555.
112 See id.
113 United States v. Yates, 404 F.3d 1291 (11 th Cir. 2005).
114 00 F.3d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 2005).
115 United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1114 (2000).
116 See Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 553.
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closed circuit testimony better preserved the defendant's right to
confrontation than a deposition of the witness pursuant to Rule 15
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-the other option open
to the trial court at that time." 7 To justify a Rule 15 deposition, a
finding of "exceptional circumstances" is required." 8 As such,
although the Gigante court declined to apply the "important public
policy" interest standard established in Craig,"9 it still required a
heightened evidentiary threshold to justify the use of two-way
closed circuit testimony. 20  Additionally, even though it rejected
the reasoning in Gigante, the Yates opinion (with which the Eighth
Circuit had expressly aligned its decision) similarly acknowledged
that an important public policy consideration must be present to
justify tampering with a defendant's right to confrontation. 121
Recognition that alternative forms of testimony should only be
used to further important public policy interests, coupled with the
fact that the finding of necessity in Craig was limited to one-way
closed circuit television, implies that the standards set forth in
§ 3509 constitute public policy interests sufficient to satisfy
Craig's broader "adequate showing of necessity" standard.
The crucial question in Bordeaux is not whether Craig applies.
Rather, the more pressing inquiry involves determining which of
the Craig standards should be used-the three-part test for one-
way closed circuit testimony in child cases, or the more general
"adequate showing of necessity" to further an "important public
policy" standard. If the latter, then both Bordeaux and Turning
Bear were wrongly decided and § 3509 should have controlled
whether the trial judge's findings demonstrated an "adequate
showing of necessity.'1 22
117 Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81 ("We agree that the closed-circuit presentation of
Savino's testimony afforded greater protection of Gigante's confrontation rights
than would have been provided by a Rule 15 deposition.").
118 Id.; see also Fed R. Crim. P. 15 (2005).
119 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
120 See Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81.
121 United States v. Yates, 391 F.3d 1182, 1187 (1 1th Cir. 2004), vacated, 404
F.3d 1291 (2005) ("[T]he prosecutor's need for the testimony in order to make a
case and expeditiously resolve it are not public policies that are important
enough to outweigh a defendant's right to confront an accuser face-to-face.").
122 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
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There is strong support for this conclusion. First, Craig was
limited to child witness cases involving one-way closed circuit
testimony. Second, § 3509 specifically applies to testimony by
two-way closed circuit television, and allows the child to testify
out of the presence of the defendant for reasons other than those
articulated in Craig. Third, both Gigante and Yates support the
conclusion that two-way closed circuit testimony is more
appropriately governed by the "important public policy" or "state
interest" standard.' Finally, the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Craig that preserving the psychological and physical well-being of
children-which was the overriding purpose of the Child Victims'
and Child Witnesses' Rights statute which constitutes an
"important public policy."' 24
In sum, the Eighth Circuit mistakenly conflated one-way
closed circuit television with two-way closed circuit television.
First, in Turning Bear, the court failed to acknowledge the
distinction. Second, in Bordeaux, when the distinction became
important, the court glossed over its previous omission,
bootstrapped itself into the same conclusion using stare decisis,
and then advanced a weak alternative holding that downplayed the
significant differences between one-way and two-way closed
circuit testimony. Third, the Eighth Circuit was mistaken in both
Turning Bear and Bordeaux when it held that § 3509 was
unconstitutional to the extent it conflicts with Craig because, while
Craig addresses one-way systems and § 3509 requires two-way
systems, there is no actual conflict present. Two-way systems are
best governed by the broader holdings of Craig and Coy, that the
deprivation of face-to-face confrontation is justified if there is "an
adequate showing of necessity" and the exception furthers an
123 The Gigante court articulated the standard applied in its case as
"exceptional circumstances," which is arguably a lower threshold than that
established in Craig and Coy. 166 F.3d at 81.
124 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 853 ("We likewise conclude today that a State's
interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may
be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right
to face his or her accusers in court. That a significant majority of States have
enacted giving testimony in child abuse cases attests to the widespread belief in
importance of such a policy.").
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"important public policy." The important public policy in these
cases has already been acknowledged by both the Court in Craig
and by Congress, which enacted the Child Victims' and Witnesses'
Rights statute to guide federal courts in the application of
alternative testimony technology.
The Child Victims' and Witnesses' Rights statute should
govern the "adequate showing of necessity" for several reasons. It
best preserves the emotional and physical well-being of child
witnesses by providing a broader base of exceptions (fear,
substantial likelihood of trauma, mental or other infirmity, or
conduct by the defendant or defense counsel that causes the child
to be unable to continue testifying)'25 than Craig's case-specific
holding (that the child witness would be traumatized, not by the
courtroom generally, but by the defendant).26 In addition, the use
of a two-way system mitigates potential prejudice to the fullest
extent possible. Two-way closed circuit television is the most
effective available technology for preserving a defendant's right to
confront his or her accuser, and is surpassed only by actual face-to-
face confrontation. While there may be some merit to Justice
Scalia's observation in Coy that the truth inducing effect of face-
to-face confrontation is lost when the witness testifies outside of
the presence of the defendant,'27 this consideration is inapplicable
in the context of remote child testimony. The stress factors that
Justice Scalia argues contribute to the truth-telling impulse also are
precisely the sources of trauma that justify using alternative forms
of testimony in the first place.'28 Further, in some cases, the
emotional distress caused by face-to-face testimony in the
courtroom may actually undermine the goals of the Confrontation
Clause by paralyzing the child and preventing full and truthful
125 See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B) (2005).
126 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 856.
127 See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988).
128 Compare Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019 ("The face-to-face presence may,
unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same
token it may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by
a malevolent adult."), with id. at 1032 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that
face-to-face confrontation "may so overwhelm the child as to prevent the
possibility of effective testimony, thereby undermining the truth-finding
function of the trial itself.").
[VOL. 7:157
United States v. Bordeaux
testimony. 29 Finally, the reliability of the witness's testimony is
otherwise assured because the other interests inherent in the right
of confrontation are preserved: the witness is required to testify
under oath and be subjected to cross-examination, under conditions
where the jury can observe him or her and evaluate his or her
credibility.3 °
V. CONCLUSION
It is both reasonable and desirable to confine the three-part test
in Craig to one-way systems, and to embrace its broader holding of
"adequate showing of necessity" to further "important public
policy interests" for two-way systems. Such a perspective
harmonizes Craig with both § 3509 as well as the jurisprudence
that has evolved to specifically address two-way systems.
Eventually, the Supreme Court should provide more definitive
guidance in this area to eliminate existing ambiguity.
However, in the wake of Crawford v. Washington,' and with
both recent and prospective changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court, 3 1 it is perhaps overly optimistic to expect a more
129 Craig, 497 U.S. at 857 (1990); Coy, 487 U.S. at 1032 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
130 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46.
131 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004) ("Where testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation."). Crawford held there is a constitutionally guaranteed right to
confront witnesses, and that out of court statements intended for use as evidence
require the witness to be available for cross-examination. See id. at 63 ("The
[Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination."). Even though the element of cross-examination is preserved by
two-way testimony, actual face-to-face confrontation is not, which raises the
question of whether Craig would survive a Confrontation Clause challenge
under Crawford.
132 See Marc Sandalow, Both Sides Prepare for Fight Over Alito, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Nov. 1, 2005, at Al. ("The nomination [of Judge Samuel Alito, Jr.]
takes on added significance because Alito would replace Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who is regarded as the court's pivotal swing vote, often providing the
deciding balance to the conservative or liberal side. While replacing the late
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expansive exception to the Confrontation Clause.' On the
contrary, there is a danger that the Court, in light of these recent
developments, will affirm the rigid requirement of confrontation in
Crawford and may, as a result, lose sight of the important policy
concerns that prompted exceptions for child witness testimony in
the first place. Given the possibility of a substantial ideological
shift in the Roberts Court, the future of Craig itself is unclear, as is
the permissibility of alternative forms of testimony for child
witnesses in general.'34
On the other hand, there is widespread recognition of the
important interests underlying the child witness testimony
exception.'35 In light of these concerns, the Court in the future
should clarify and bring the exception for child witnesses into
closer alignment with actual face-to-face confrontation by
upholding the constitutionality of two-way closed circuit testimony
Chief Justice William Rehnquist with a conservative such as Roberts was not
expected to shift the court's ideological balance, replacing O'Connor with Alito
would likely fulfill Bush's campaign promise to move the court decidedly to the
right."). See also Scott Shepard, Roberts Foes, Supporters Square Off" As
Hearings Near, Groups Trade Shots, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug.
25, 2005, at 7A. ("Referring to one of the most conservative justices, [Ralph]
Neas [president of People for the American Way] said Roberts was 'an Antonin
Scalia in sheep's clothing' and if confirmed would 'dramatically shift' the
court's ideological balance 'to the far right for decades to come.').
133 See Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and
Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, 20 CRIM. JUST. 24, 35 (Summer
2005) ("So far, there has been no direct judicial attack on Craig even though
Crawford clearly has a vision of the Confrontation Clause that rejects the type of
balancing approach that Craig applied.").
134 See id.
135 See id. at 32-33 ("Child abuse cases are often difficult for prosecutors to
win because the abuse takes place in secret, there is typically no physical
evidence of abuse in molestation cases not involving penetration, and even rape
may not provide physical evidence because the crime is often reported well after
it occurred, and children heal quickly. The fact that children disclose in stages
also increases the likelihood of inconsistencies in the child's testimony. In
addition, questioning by a family member, doctor, psychologist, or police officer
may be perceived as leading, producing unreliable answers. Like domestic
violence victims, children often recant. Thus, the testimony of young children is
viewed more skeptically by jurors than that of adults, because of concerns over
suggestibility, manipulation, coaching, or confusing fact with fantasy.").
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in child abuse cases, a preferred option because it best protects the
interests of both the victim and the accused. 36
136 See id. at 35 ("Crawford is like the elephant in the room-counsel can't
tiptoe around it, making believe it is not there. Yet, until the Court gives more
direction as to Crawford's contours, the case law will continue to produce
inconsistent results .... ").
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